


# SHA-3 Proposal: FSB

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# High Overview of FSB

- ◇ FSB uses the Merkle-Damgård construction (chaining and padding), with a **large internal state**:
  - it uses a **final compression function**.
- ◇ the main compression function uses a one-way function from coding theory:
  - **security reduction** for inversion and collision search.



# FSB's Compression Function


## Overview

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
- ▶ The compression function of FSB is made of two steps:
  - ▷ a **non-linear** bijective step,
  - ▷ a linear compression step.
  
- ▶ First the  $s$  input bits are transformed in a binary vector of length  $n$  and Hamming weight  $w$ :
  - ▷ for efficiency we use **regular words**.
  
- ▶ Then this vector is multiplied by a binary matrix  $\mathcal{H}$ 
  - ▷  $w \ll n$  so this is simply the XOR of  $w$  columns of  $\mathcal{H}$ .

- ▶ In practice  $\mathcal{H}$  is a truncated quasi-cyclic matrix


**circulant**



**quasi-cyclic**



**truncated quasi-cyclic**



- ▶ In practice  $\mathcal{H}$  is a truncated quasi-cyclic matrix
  - ▷  $\mathcal{H}$  is described by its first line:  $\frac{n}{r}$  vectors of  $p$  bits.
  - ▷ columns of  $\mathcal{H}$  are truncated cyclic shifts of these binary vectors.
  - ▷ which vectors to choose and how much they should be shifted depends on the input:
    - $w$  indexes are derived from 13 or 14 input bits each,
    - 8 IV/chaining bits and 5 or 6 message bits,
    - the  $i$ -th index is taken in the interval  $[i\frac{n}{w}, (i+1)\frac{n}{w}-1]$ ,
    - the  $w$  indexes correspond to the  $w$  columns to XOR.

The best algorithms that can be used to attack FSB are:

- ▶ Generalized birthday algorithm

- ▷ best algorithm for inversion and second preimage,
- ▷ requires a lot of memory.

- ▶ Information set decoding

- ▷ best algorithm for collision search,
- ▷ yields strong constraints on the choice of  $r$  and  $w$ .

- ▶ Proposed parameters have been chosen according to these algorithms, plus a security margin.

- ▶ **Inverting** the compression function requires to find  $w$  columns of  $\mathcal{H}$  which XOR to a target vector.
  - ▷ this is an instance of the **syndrome decoding problem**,
  - ▷ this problem is NP-complete for random matrices, but also for truncated quasi-cyclic matrices,
  - ▷ well chosen values of  $p$  and  $r$  give supposedly hard instances of the problem.
  
- ▶ **Collisions** require  $2w$  columns of  $\mathcal{H}$  which XOR to 0.
  - ▷ also an instance of the syndrome decoding problem,
  - ▷ an “easier” instance in practice.

- ▶ An important point is that these reductions are **tight**.

adversary	best attack	reduction
collision	$\text{ISD}(n, r, 2w) \times 1$	$\text{CSD}(n, r, 2w)/1$
preimage	$\text{GBA}(n, r, w) \times 1$	$\text{CSD}(n, r, w)/1$
second-preimage	$\text{GBA}(n - w, r, w) \times 1$	$\text{CSD}(n - w, r - w, w)/1$

ISD = Information set decoding

GBA = Generalized birthday algorithm

CSD = Computational syndrome decoding.

- ▶ One call to the adversary solves the CSD problem, one call to ISD/GBA is enough to build an adversary.

# Final Compression Function

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Few constraints apply to the final compression function.

- ▶ it must not weaken the main compression function
  - ▷ any linear function is bad
    - simple truncation is impossible.
- ▶ it does not require collision resistance/one-wayness
  - ▷ collisions on the final compression do not directly lead to collisions on FSB
- ▶ Cryptographers and the NIST need to be convinced...
  - ▷ anything too simple should be avoided.

# Final Compression Function

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We propose to use Whirlpool [Rijmen, Barreto 2004]:

- ▶ The  $r$ -bit output of the main compression function is input as an  $r$ -bit message to Whirlpool
  - ▷ the final output is a **truncated Whirlpool hash**.

This is a **safe choice**, not an efficiency oriented choice:

- ▷ Whirlpool is highly non-linear,
- ▷ we are confident that it is a secure hash function,
- ▷ attacks on Whirlpool would probably not affect our construction.

- ▶ The main compression functions is very simple:
  - ▷ shift and XOR  $w$  times some vectors
    - with precomputed shifts, only XORs are required.
  - ▷ parameters of FSB are quite large
    - the XORs are expensive: 250 to 500 cycles/byte.
  
- ▶ The description of FSB is large:
  - ▷ 2 millions bits from digits of  $\pi$  define the vectors
    - this is a problem for constrained environments,
  - ▷ using pseudo-random data could improve this but would loosen the security reduction.

- ▶ The main interest of FSB is its compression function:
  - ◇ inversion and collision search reduce to hard problems,
  - ◇ it is slow, but much faster than most “similar designs,”
  - ◇ it is very simple to describe/implement
    - only very basic operations are used,
  - ◇ the description of FSB is large as “random bits” are needed.
  
- ▶ Security reduction to hard problems comes at a cost, but it can be practical in many contexts.